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TEN YEARS AFTER: BARTNICKI V. VOPPER AS A
LABORATORY FOR FIRST AMENDMENT ADVOCACY
AND ANAL YSIS
Eric B. Easton·
1. INTRODUCTION
How many ways can one approach a First Amendment analysis? What
influences a lawyer or a judge to select one analytical approach over
another? And what is the long-term effect of a court's choice of one over
another? In Bartnicki v. Vopper/ a 2001 case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court considered federal and state statutes prohibiting the disclosure of
illegally intercepted telephone conversations,2 we are privileged to have a
small laboratory through which to study the first two questions. And, from
the vantage point of ten years, we ought to be able to make some informed
predictions as to the third.
In Bartnicki, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
gave the news media a right to publish truthful information on matters of
public concern, even if unlawfully acquired, provided the publisher did not
participate in the unlawful conduct.3 How the Court ultimately reached that
conclusion is one principal focus of this Article, precisely because the story
of this litigation reveals so much about alternative First Amendment
analyses and the process of influencing the courts' choices among them.
In this one case, the district court framed the issue as a battle between
conflicting and potentially controlling precedents.4 The circuit court

• Eric B. Easton is Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law.
532 U.8. 514(2001).
2 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2010) ("Except
as otherwise specifically provided in tllis chapter, any person who ... (c) intentionally discloses, or
endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oml, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire,
oml, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be punished . . . .");
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2010)
("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree ifhe ...
(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral
communication ....").
3 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 ("[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.").
4 See infra Part III.
I
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selected a doctrinal formula called "intermediate scrutiny" and applied it in
textbook fashion to reach its conclusion. 5 And the U.S. Supreme Court
resorted to an "ad hoc balancing" of interests in personal privacy versus
publicly significant information, ultimately ruling in favor of the latter. 6
Even more interesting are the reasons why the courts made the
decisions they did. Did they track the arguments of the party litigants? How
influential was the U.S. government's intervention to defend the federal
stahite at issue? And what role did the media defense bar play? Bartnicki
provides an excellent opportunity to study the press's increasing
sophistication in helping to shape First Amendment doctrine through
litigation in the Supreme Court. 7
Some seventy years earlier, the press's first serious effort in Near v.
Minnesota 8 established the supremacy of the right to publish.9 Forty years
later, the disastrous decision in Branzburg v. Hayes lO stunted any First
Amendment right to gather news and revealed the need for coordinated
media attention to doctrinal litigation. I I Now, after another thirty years, the
Bartnicki case brought publishing and newsgathering issues together, and
this time the press proved to be up to the challenge.
As interesting as this case may be from analytical and strategic
perspectives, the implications of Bartnicki's contribution to First
Amendment doctrine are difficult to discern. The Court allowed a law. abiding press to publish with impunity truthful, important information,
regardless of its initial unlawful acquisition, but did it significantly expand
the public's right to receive newsworthy information?
The question actually presented by this case was whether the
broadcaster could, consistent with the First Amendment, be punished for his
dissemination of publicly significant information initially acquired from an
unknown person who had illegally intercepted a private telephone
conversation. 12 Both federal and state statutes provided a civil cause of

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part VI.
7 This is the fourth in a series of articles on the subject of the press as a constitutional litigator,
beginning with Eric B. Easton, The Press as an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in the United States
Supreme Court, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 247 (2007) [hereinafter Interest Group] and including Eric B.
Easton, The Colonel's Finest Campaign: Robert R. McCormick and Near v. Minnesota, 60 FED. COMM.
L.J. 183 (2008) [hereinafter McCormick] and Eric B. Easton, A House Divided: Earl Caldwell, the New
York Times, and the Quest for a Testimonial Privilege, 2009 UTAH L. REv .. 1293 [hereinafter Caldwell].
8 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9 See McCormick, supra note 7, at 223.
10 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
II See Caldwell, supra note 7, at 1294.
12 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,524-25 (2001).
5

6
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action for not only the interception, but also the further disclosure of the
intercepted conversation. 13
In declaring the disclosure provision unconstitutional as applied,
however, the Court declined to abstract its holding to a legal principle. The
ambiguity of the decision suggests that a different balance could be struck if
the subject matter of the disclosure were, say, national security rather than
labor relations matters. The conclusion of this Article looks to the
contemporary WikiLeaks.com controversy to illuminate this issue ,14
Part II of this Article recounts the underlying facts of the Bartnicki case
and its procedural posture up to certiorari. Part III examines the two
contending precedents initially asserted by the parties and accepted as the
basis for analysis in the district court. Part IV looks at the shift to doctrinal
analysis in the court of appeals, prompted at least in part by the federal
government's entry into the case. Part V studies the proceedings before the
U.S. Supreme Court, with emphasis on the participation and analytical
approach of prominent media lawyers. Part VI dissects the opinion and the
shift to an ad hoc balancing approach, particularly in light of the press
arguments, while Part VII ventures some predictions about the significance
of the decision with the WikiLeaks.com controversy as a backdrop.
II. "BLOW OFF THEIR FRONT PORCHES"?
The Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania encompasses the cities of
Scranton, Pittston, and Wilkes-Barre, and numerous smaller towns,
including the boroughs of Courtdale, Edwardsville, Forty Fort, Larksville,
Luzerne, Plymouth, Pringle, Kingston, and Swoyersville. 15 These towns, all
by Interstate Highway 81 and just a little northwest of Wilkes-Barre, are
served by the Wyoming Valley West School DistriCt. 16 The district boasts
seven elementary schools, a middle school, and a high school, with about
5,000 students altogether. 17

13 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2010) ("[AJny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover
from the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as
may be appropriate."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725(a) (2010) ("Any person whose wire, electronic or
oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause
of action against any person who intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept,
disclose or use, such communication .... ").
14 See Wikileaks, 1HE HUFF\NGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpostcomlnewslwikileaks (last visited
Nov. 23,2011).
15 Wyoming Valley West School District, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilWyominlL
Valley-West_School_District (last modified Oct. 14,2011).
16 [d.
17 [d.
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From mid-1992 until November 1993, the district was tom by a
contract dispute between the Wyoming Valley West School Board and the
Wyoming Valley West Education Association, the union representing the
district's 341 teachers. 18 Five months of hard bargaining for a new teachers'
contract turned nasty in October 1992, when the board decided to warn
teachers that they might be subject to furlough a week before the next
scheduled bargaining session. 19 By March 1993, the teachers had halted all
volunteer work, including chaperoning school activities/o and in May the
union threatened to strike in early June unless their salary demands were
met. 21
The union was asking for six percent increases each year for the next
three years, raising the average salary from $40,000 to $47,640 in 1994.22
The board was standing firm at three percent per year for three years?3 The
teachers' health insurance plan was also in dispute?4 At 10:30 p.m. on May
27, 1993, the union delivered a strike notice to the home of Superintendent
Dr. Norman Namey/5 and on June 4, the teachers launched their first strike
in the twenty-seven-year history of the district. 26
The timing of that strike was the subject of one particular cellular
telephone conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane, Jr.,

18 See Leanora Minai, Teachers at WVW Threaten to Strike: The Situation Appears 'Bleak,' a School
Director Concedes, TiMEs LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), May 22, 1993, at A3, available at httpilwww.times
leader.comIarchivel6865272.htrnl.
19 James Rubin, Union Head: Furlough Slips Add Tension to WVW Contract Talks: Teachers and
Board Directors in the Wyoming Valley West School District Returning to Bargaining Table This Week,
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 19, 1992, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/
6865272.html.
20 Charles H. Bogino, Volunteer Work Halted by Teachers at WVW: Activities and Chaperoning
Are Falling Victim to a Contract Dispute Between Teachers and the School District, TIMES LEADER
(Wilkes-Barre), Mar. 19, 1993, at AI, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/6865272.html.
21 Minai, supra note 18.
22 Id.
23 Tom Obrzut & Gina Thackara, Contract Offer Best We Can Do. Says WVW Board Member:
Under the Proposal. Teachers Would Receive a 3-Percent Raise Each Year for the Next Three Years,
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), June 7, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/
6865272.html.
24 Anne Karolyi, WVW Could See Strike in Exam Week: Salary Increases and a Health Insurance
Plan Are the Two Chief Points of Contention, the Head of the Teachers' Union Says, TIMES LEADER
(Wilkes-Barre), May 29, 1993, at AI, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/6865272.html.
2l Id.
26 Anne Karolyi, Striking Wyoming Valley West Teachers Picket the High School Friday in
Plymouth While Seniors File into the Cafeteria: Economics Lesson Valley West Strike to End Tuesday.
but Battle over Contract Will Continue, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), June 6, 1993, at AI, available at
http://www.timesleader.comlarchivel6865272.html. The teachers picketed on Friday and Monday, then
went back to school on Tuesday in compliance with a state statute. See id.
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sometime in May.2? Bartnicki was employed by the Pennsylvania State
Education Association (PSEA) and assigned as a negotiator in the
Wyoming Valley West School District contract dispute. 28 Kane was a
teacher at Wyoming Valley West High School and president of the PSEA
29
local, the Wyoming Valley West Education Association.
But it was another remark by Kane that captured the attention of the
public-and the legal system-when the conversation was broadcast
several months later: "If they're [the School Directors] not going to move
for three percent (3%), we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ... to
blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those
guys .... ,,30 How the public came to know of this conversation forms the
factual predicate of this case.
The contentious contract negotiations prompted the formation of a
citizens' group called the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers' Association to
oppose the teachers' union proposals?l Sometime after the conversation
took place, still during the spring of 1993, the president of that organization,
Jack Yocum, allegedly found a five-minute tape of the conversation in his
mailbox. 32 Yocum claimed not to know who made the tape or why,33 but he
listened to it, identified the voices, played it for some school board
members, and gave copies of the tape to Frederick W. Vopper. 34 Vopper
had a news and public affairs talk show under the name "Fred Williams"
that was broadcast on WILK Radio and simulcast on WGBI-AM. 35
By all accounts, Vopper did nothing with the tape until late
September.36 By then, contract negotiations had completely broken down,
the dispute had been submitted to non-binding arbitration, the arbitrator had
sided with the teachers' union, and the school board had rejected the

27 A transcript of the conversation between Bartnicki and Kane was prepared by WILK Radio, one
of the defendants in Barrnicki v. Vopper, and a copy of the transcript is attached to the Media
Defendants' answer (29a-30a) and their motion for summary judgment, as Exhibit "A" (315a-326a).
Amended Brief of Appellants at 8, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7156),
1998 WL 34082380, at *8. The exact date oftb.e conversation is not in the record.
28 Id. at 3, 1998 WL 43082380, at .3.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 8, 1998 WL 43082380, at .8.
31 Id. at 6, 1998 WL 43082380, at ·6.
32 Id. at 7, 1998 WL 43082380, at·7 (citing Yocum's deposition).
33

Id.

Id. Yocum also gave copies to Rob Neyhard at WARM Radio, and Kane's deposition states that
copies were given to the Times Leader and Citizens' Voice newspapers, as well as television stations
WNEP-TV and WBRE-TV. Only Yocum, Vopper, and the two radio stations that carried Vopper's
program were named as defendants in the subsequent lawsuit. Id. at 7-8, 1998 WL 43082380, at ·7-8.
35 Id. at 7,1998 WL43082380, at *7.
36 See id. at 8, 1998 WL 43082380, at ·8.
34
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arbitrator's decision. 37 About the same time, Vopper, who had been critical
of the teachers' union in the past/8 began airing the tape repeatedly, while
adding bomb-like sound effects. 39 Intended or not, the tapes had the effect
of further inflaming the contract dispute,40 and the Luzerne County District
Attorney launched an investigation at the behest of the school board.41 In
the end, neither his investigation nor another undertaken by the PSEA could
determine who actually made the tape. 42 According to Vopper's first
attorney, the question remains unanswered to this day.43
The contract dispute was ultimately settled in November after the
school board offered salary increases of sixteen percent over four years,44
but the controversy over Vopper's broadcasts continued; in August 1994,
Bartnicki and Kane filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania against Vopper and the parent companies
of the stations that carried his show (the "media defendants") under civil
suit provisions of federal and state wiretap laws.45 The unknown persons
who intercepted the conversation were also named as John Doe and Jane
Doe. 46
The media defendants retained Donald H. Brobst of the Wilkes-Barre
law firm Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., to represent them in district

37 Anne Karolyi, Arbitrator Suggests Raises at WVW: The Negotiator Says Teachers Should
Receive Their Requested Salary Increase. but Directors Seem Unwilling to Sway from Their Offer,
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Sept. 28, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/
6865272.html. The Supreme Court opinion says the parties accepted the arbitrator's proposal, but the
contemporaneous news reports seem more reliable on this point. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 512 U.S. 514,
519 (2001).
38 Bannicki, 512 U.S. at 519.
39 Brief of Appellees at 5, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7156),1998
WL 34083465, at *5. Indeed, the District Attorney for Wilkes-Barre testified that Vopper and WILK
were so irresponsible that his office refused to send press releases to WILK. Brief of Pennsylvania State
Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3 n.l, Bartnicki, 200 F.3d 109
(No. 98-7 I 56), 1998 WL 34083460, at *3 n. I .
40 Anne Karolyi, Alleged Threat by Union Heightens WVW Friction: Those Who Have Heard the
Tape Allege Someone Says School Directors Could Suffer Property Damage at Their Homes if They Do
Not Make Contract Concessions, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 3, 1993, at A3, available at
http://www.timesleader.comlarchivel6865272.html.
41 See Jim Van Nostrand, DA Will Probe Alleged Threats upon WVW Request: Several Directors
Say They Will Ask Fellow Board Members to Formally Request an Investigation. Perhaps at Tonight's
Meeting, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 2, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.coml
archive/6865272.html.
42 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 7,1998 WL 34082380, at *7.
43 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
(June 25, 2010) (recording on file with author).
44 Anne Karolyi, The Battle Ends: Valley West Board OKs Pact on 5-4 Vote, TIMES LEADER
(Wilkes-Barre), Nov. 4,1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchivel6865272.html.
45 See supra note 13.
46 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 3, 1998 WL 34082380, at *3.
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court. 47 Brobst had long represented WILK and its then-parent company,
Keyrnarket of NEPA (Northeastern Pennsylvania), Inc., and this was
neither the first nor the last case he had involving Fred Vopper. 48 In
addition to his defamation and other media law work, Brobst specialized in
employment law cases,49 and he both initiated and defended cases brought
under § 1983 of title 42 of the U. S. Code, which gives plaintiffs a federal
cause of action when deprived of a constitutional right under color of state
law.
The media defendants filed their answer in September. 50 The following
February, they consented to the plaintiffs' amending their complaint to add
Yocum as a defendant. 51 Yocum answered on June 30, 1995.52 After
extensive discovery, the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for summary
judgment, with both defendants asserting a First Amendment right to
disclose the conversation. 53 By Memorandum and Order dated June 17,
1996, the District Court denied both motions, ruling that the circumstances
of the interception and the defendants' knowledge of them represented
genuine issues of material fact, but that imposing liability on the defendants
would not violate the First Amendment. 54
The court denied the defendants' subsequent motion to reconsider in
November, and in January 1998, the court certified that its orders were
appealable. 55 On January 14, the media defendants filed an appeal in the

47
48
49

50
51
52
5}

See Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
See id
See id
Amended Briefof Appellants, supra note 27, at 3, 1998 WL 34082380, at *3.
Id. at 4, 1998 WL 34082380, at *4.
Id.
Id.

Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 22517, at *12 (M.D. Pa. June
14,1996).
55 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 2, 1998 WL 34082380, at *2. The court ruled
that the orders denying summary judgment "involved controlling questions of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal ... will materially advance
the ultimate determination of this litigation." Id. at 5,1998 WL 34082380, at *5. As articulated by the
Third Circuit, those questions were:
54

(1) whether the imposition of liability on the media Defendants under the [wiretapping
statutes] solely for broadcasting the newsworthy tape on the Defendant Fred Williams' radio
news/public affairs program, when the tape was illegally intercepted and recorded by
unknown persons who were not agents of the Defendants, violates the First Amendment; and
(2) whether imposition of liability under the aforesaid [wiretapping statutes] on Defendant
Jack Yocum solely for providing the anonymously intercepted and recorded tape to the
media Defendants violates the First Amendment.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.s. 1260 (2000).
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with the concurrence of the
other parties to the litigation. 56 The Third Circuit granted the petition on
February 26,57 and after receiving briefs from the parties 58 and the PSEA as
amicus curiae,59 heard oral arguments on October 5. The United States,
which intervened as of right and at the invitation of the court to defend the
constitutionality of the federal statute,60 filed a brief on November 17,
1998,61 but to no avail. On December 27, 1999, the Third Circuit reversed
the District Court,62 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on June
26,2000. 63
III. DISTRICT COURT: BATTLE OF THE PRECEDENTS
In his motion for summary judgment, Brobst had argued for the media
defendants that Bartnicki and Kane could not prove that their telephone
conversation had been illegally-that is, intentionally and not
inadvertently-intercepted, or that Vopper knew or had reason to know that
the telephone conversation was illegally intercepted. 64 He also argued that
Bartnicki had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation,
which took place on a cellular telephone that she acknowledged was
susceptible to interception. 65 Brobst later conceded that neither of these
factual arguments was persuasive, and that he staked everything on the First
Amendment argument from the beginning.66 Brobst's First Amendment
argument relied almost exclusively on Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia and the line of constitutional privacy cases, beginning with Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn and ending with Florida Star v. B.J.F,67 to

Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 2, 1998 WL 34082380, at *2.
[d.
58 See Brief of Appellees, supra note 39, 1998 WL 34083465; Addendum to Brief of Appellees,
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d 109 (No. 98-7156),1998 WL 34082372; Briefon Behalf of Appellee, Jack Yocum,
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d \09 (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082376; Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note
27, 1998 WL 34082380.
59 See Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees, supra note 39, 1998 WL 34083460.
60 Brief for the United States at I, Bartnicki, 200 F.3d 109 (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082480, at
*1.
56
57

61

!d.

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 530 U.S. 1260 (2001).
64 Brief in Support of Media Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Bartnicki v. Vopper, No.
3:CV-94-1201, at 19 (M.D. Pa. July 1996) (on file with author).
65 [d. at 21.
66 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
67 Brief in Support of Media Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 14-19.
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of this line of cases. Throughout this Article, the lawyers and judges
62
63

2011]

TEN YEARS AFTER: BARTNICKI V. VOPPER

295

which Landmark belongs. Those cases held that "where the media lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance or
concern, government officials may not constitutionally punish the
publication of that information absent the need to further a government
interest of a higher order.'.68 Brobst later said he focused on Landmark in
particular because the governmental interests there-maintaining the
reputation of the judges and the institutional integrity of the courts-were
far greater than the privacy interests protected in this case. 69
To U.S. District Court Judge Edwin M. Kosik, however, the Bartnicki
case essentially countered Brobst's Landmark rule with another wellestablished First Amendment principle: that "generally applicable laws 'do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news. ",70 Judge Kosik referred to this principle as the Cohen doctrine after
Cohen v. Cowles Media, the only case cited for that proposition in his
opinion/I despite its much earlier origins.72 A closer examination of the two
conflicting precedents follows.
A. The Constitutional Privacy Cases

The genesis of the notion that plaintiffs ought to be able to recover for
an invasion of their privacy was an 1890 Harvard Law Review article by
Louis Brandeis and his law partner Samuel Warren. 73 The concept did not
exist in English common law, and invasion of privacy is often called the
only truly American tort. Dean William L. Prosser's classification scheme
for the American common law privacy torts included misappropriation of
name or likeness, publicity in a false light, intrusion on seclusion, and
disclosure of private facts. 74 Apart from the five cases that substantively
parallel the tort of disclosure of private facts-which are the central focus

will variously reference this line, and the principle derived from it, as the Landmark, Daily Mail, or
Florida Star rule or principle.
68 Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June
14,1996).
69 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
70 Bartnicki, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *11 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663,669 (1991)).
71 Id. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of this case.
72 As applied to First Amendment claims, the doctrine goes back at least as far as Grosjean v.
American Press Co., which contained Justice Sutherland's dictum that owners of newspapers are not
"immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government." 297 U.S. 233,250
(1936).
73 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
74 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,389 (1960).
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of this section-only three privacy cases involving the press ever reached
the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the 1967 case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court declined to award
damages in a false light privacy claim under a New York statute absent a
showing of actual malice. 75 In the 1974 case of Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., the Court upheld a jury verdict finding that a Cleveland
Plain Dealer reporter had knowingly placed the Cantrell family in a false
light through numerous inaccuracies and false statements in his article
about them. 76 And in the 1977 case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., the Court held that an Ohio television station
misappropriated the entire act of a circus "human cannonball" by filming
and broadcasting his entire, fifteen-second act. 77
Of far greater importance, however, was the series of five privacyrelated cases that reached the Court between 1975 and 1989. None of these
cases directly implicated the tort of public disclosure of private facts; the
press rarely lost those cases in the state courts because of an absolute
"newsworthiness" defense that was said to have "swallowed" the tort itself.
The cases that did get to the Court, however, were all based, directly or
indirectly, on statutes that criminalized the publication of truthful, but
embarrassing, information. Sometimes they were characterized as prior
restraints, sometimes as subsequent punishment.
On August 18, 1971, Cynthia Leslie Cohn, seventeen, was raped and
suffocated to death by six high school boys following a drinking party in
Sandy Springs, Fulton County, Georgia. 78 In April 1972, when the six
perpetrators were arraigned, five pled guilty to rape-the murder charges
against them having been dropped-and a date was set for the trial of the
youth who pled not guilty.79 A reporter covering the case for WSB-TV duly
broadcast the story later that day, including, for the first time in any media,
the name of the victim. 80 The reporter had learned the name from personal
observation of the proceedings and from the indictments, which were public
records available to anyone who asked. 81 The next month, Martin Cohn,
Cynthia Cohn's father, filed a lawsuit against the Cox Broadcasting Corp.,
the owner of WSB-TV, for invasion of privacy and for violating a Georgia

7S
76
77

78
79

80
81

385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967).
419 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1974).
433 U.S. 562, 563-66 (1977).
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471, 474 n.5 (1975).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 472-73.
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statute that prohibited the publication or broadcasting of the name of any
rape victim. 82
The trial court held that the statute gave Cohn a private right of action
against Cox, notwithstanding the broadcaster's constitutional claims, and
granted Cohn summary judgment as to liability, with damages to be
considered at a later jury trial. 83 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the statute did not give Cohn a private right of action, so summary
judgment was inappropriate, but also that Cohn's common law invasion of
privacy claim was not precluded by the First Amendment. 84 On a motion
for rehearing, the state supreme court held that the statute was an
authoritative declaration of state policy to the effect that the name of a rape
victim was not a matter of public concern, so the right to disclose that
information was not protected by the First Amendment. 8s The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. 86
Writing for a nearly unanimous Court-only Justice Rehnquist
dissented-Justice White got to the heart of the matter. "Because the
gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether
true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful
to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the
constitutional freedoms of speech and press.,,87 Determined to approach the
constitutional balance cautiously, Justice White largely restricted his
holding to the facts at hand. The state may not, he wrote, "impose sanctions
on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from
public records-more specifically, from judicial records which are
maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves
are open to public inspection. ,,88 If the state wanted to keep such
information from the press, the Court said, it would have to find some way
to avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information,
possibly by sealing court records containing such facts. 89 Only Justice
Douglas would have ruled on broader grounds: that "there is no power on
the part of government to suppress or penalize the publication of 'news of

82

!d. at 474.

83

[d.

84

!d. at 474-75.
[d. at 475.
[d. at 476.
!d. at 489.
[d. at 491.
[d. at495-96.
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the day. ",90 Justice Rehnquist's dissent turned on jurisdiction, not the
merits. 91
While only regional media companies participated in the Cox case, the
next privacy case to reach the Court drew the attention of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA). Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court in and for Oklahoma County was not a tort case at all,92 but
rather challenged an injunction issued by the county court prohibiting the
news media from "publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any
manner, the name or picture" of an eleven-year-old boy alleged to have shot
and killed a railroad switchman. 93 Reporters were able to learn his name and
take his photograph during and after an open detention hearing, and they
used both in the newspaper, radio, and television stories that followed. 94 A
few days later, when the boy appeared in court again for arraignment, the
judge closed the proceeding and issued the injunction. 95 On appeal, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the judge's order, but the U.S. Supreme
Court stayed the order. 96 It granted certiorari and, in the same per curiam
opinion, reversed. 97
As if to illustrate the relationship between prior restraint and privacy
cases, the Court, relying on both Cox and Nebraska Press v. Stuart,98 held
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to
prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at
court proceedings which were in fact open to the public.,,99 The Court's
very brief opinion closely tracked the arguments made by ANPA in its
amicus brief, but did not follow ANPA's suggestion for a general rule to
avoid "a constant stream of minor fact variations which will needlessly take
up the time of this Court and ofthe press in preventing encroachments upon
the First and Fourteenth Amendments by trial judges who do not yet believe
or perhaps understand the teachings of this Court . . . . ,,100 The Court

90
91

Id at 501 (Douglas, 1., concurring).
Id at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

92

430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).

93

97

Id at 308-{)9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 309.
Id at 308, 309 n.l.
Id at 308.
Id. at 309.

98

427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversing a court order prohibiting publication of facts adduced in open

94

9S

96

trial).

Okla. Pub/'g Co., 430 U.S. at 310.
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n at 18, Okla. Publ'g Co., 430 U.S.
308 (No. 76-867),1977 WL 189322, at *18.
99

100
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continued to resist formulating a broad, general rule in the next privacyrelated case the following year.
On October 4, 1975, Landmark's Virginian-Pilof published an article
that accurately reported on a pending inquiry by the Virginia Judicial
Inquiry and Review Commission and identified the state judge whose
conduct was being investigated. 101 A month later, a grand jury indicted
Landmark for violating a state statute by ''unlawfully divulg[ing] the
identification of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge was the
102
subject of an investigation and hearing" by the Commission. Landmark
was convicted of a misdemeanor in a bench trial and fined $500. 103 The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, citing the need to protect
the judge's reputation from the publicity that might attend frivolous claims;
preserve public confidence in the judicial system; and protect complainants
and witnesses before the Commission. I04 Landmark appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. \05
In contrast to Cox and even Oklahoma Publishing, Landmark attracted
the attention of a substantial number of media companies and press
associations. \06 The media companies argued that under the Constitution,
none of the purported interests cited by the Virginia Supreme Court could
be protected by imposing criminal sanctions on the press and calling for a
rule barring accurate reports of government affairs. 107 The press
associations similarly argued that the Constitution barred states from
imposing criminal sanctions for publishing information on the public duties
of public officials. \08 As before, the Court shied away from any generalized
pronouncement. Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Chief Justice

Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831 (1978).
Id.
103 Id. at 832.
104 Id. at 833.
105 Id. at 834 (indicating that the Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision).
106 See Brief Amicus Curiae of American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Landmark Commc'ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450), 1977 WL 189715 [hereinafter Brief of Media Companies]; Brief of the
National Newspaper Ass'n & the Arizona Newspapers Ass'n et a!. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant, Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450), 1977 WL 189717 [hereinafter Brief
of Press Associations]; Brief of the Washington Post Co. & CBS Inc. et a!., Amici Curiae, in Support of
Reversal, Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450),1977 WL 189719; Motion of the
ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae, and Brief Amici Curiae,
Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450),1977 WL 189721.
107 Brief of Media Companies, supra note \06, 1977 WL 189719, at *16-33.
108 Brief of Press Associations, supra note 106, 1977 WL 189717, at *4-15.
101
102
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Burger found it "unnecessary to adopt this categorical approach to resolve
the issue.,,109 He continued:
The narrow and limited question presented, then, is whether the First
Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third persons who are
strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for divulging or
publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. We are not here concerned with
the possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the information
by illegal means and thereafter divulges it.
... We conclude that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its
statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the
Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal
sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments
on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom. 110

Even without propounding the general rule sought by the press, the
Court had, in these three cases, begun to make clear that privacy interestsincluding the name of a rape victim, a juvenile offender, or even a judge
merely accused of wrongdoing-would not be enough to overcome the
presumptive right of the press to publish truthful information, lawfully
acquired, on matters of public concern, even if the publication was
otherwise prohibited by a state's legislature or its courts. I II In Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court would make that rule explicit. I 12
The 1979 case, like Oklahoma Publishing, involved an indictment
against two West Virginia newspapers for violating state law by publishing,
without a court's permission, the name of a fourteen-year-old who had shot
and killed a high school classmate.113 In this case, however, the reporters
did not obtain the name in open court, but by monitoring the police band
radio frequency, going to the scene, and interviewing witnesses, police, and
a prosecutor.11 4 The papers sought and won a writ of prohibition against
prosecution from the West Virginia Supreme Court, which held that
prosecution would be unconstitutional under recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, but the attorney general of West Virginia filed a successful

109
110

III
112

113
114

LandmarkCommc'ns,!nc.,435 u.s. at 838.

[d. at 837, 838 (citations omitted).
[d. at 841-42.
443 U.S. 97,105--06 (1979).
[d at 99-100.
[d at 99.
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s
petition for certiorari on behalf of the trial judge, Robert K. Smith." Once
6
again, the press amici came out in force to support the newspapers." Once
117
again, the ACLU added its voice to that of the press. Once again, Floyd
Abrams, who had represented Landmark Communications, was
representing the newspaper. 118 Once again, the Chief Justice wrote the
opinion for a nearly unanimous COurt. 119
Because of the language of the statute requiring a court order before
publishing the name of a juvenile offender, the press amici tended to
characterize the statute as a prior restraint-even though the information
had already been published and the case reached the Court through a
criminal prosecution. 120 Chief Justice Burger agreed after a fashion:
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for
publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive
because even the latter action requires the highest form of state interest to
sustain its validity. Prior restraints have been accorded the most exacting
scrutiny in previous cases. However, even when a state attempts to punish
publication after the event it must nevertheless demonstrate that its
punitive action was necessary to further the state interests asserted. Since
we conclude that this statute cannot satisfy the constitutional standards
defined in Landmark Communications, Inc., we need not decide whether,
. restramt.
. 121
as argue d by respondents, It· operated as a pnor
But Chief Justice Burger went further and gave the press the general
rule it had been seeking. He pointed out that in the previous cases-Cox,
Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark Communications-the press received
the information from the government or government sources, so those cases
did not directly control the outcome here, where the press gathered the
information through routine reporting techniques. 122 Asserting that it made
no difference-"[a] free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the

Id at 100.
Motion of Chicago Tribune Co. for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Daily
Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (No. 78-482), 1979 WL 199841; Motion of American Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.s. 97 (No.
78482), 1979 WL 199845 [hereinafter Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n); Motion of American
Society of Newspaper Editors & Radio Television News Directors Ass'n et aI. fer Leave to File Brief, Amici
Curiae, Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (No. 78482),1979 WL 199839.
117 Motion of the ACLU for Leave to File, and Brief Amicus Curiae, Daily Mail Publ 'g Co., 443
U.S. 97 (No. 78482), 1979 WL 213634.
lIS Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. at 98.
lIS

116

119
120
121
122

Jd

Briefof American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n,supra note 116, 1979 WL \99845, at "10.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. at lOH)2 (citations omitted).
Id at 103.
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sufferance of government to supply it with information,,123--Chief Justice
Burger said those cases "suggested" the general rule: "if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance
then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.,,124
Articulation of a rule seemed to put an end to this kind of litigation, as
Justice White had once predicted,125 but ten years later, another similar case
again reached the Court. In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a novice reporter picked
up a police report that identified sexual assault victim B.J.F. by her full
name from the Jacksonville police press room. 126 The unedited report had
been left there inadvertently.127 When the paper ran a brief item using her
full name, contrary to its own editorial policy and a Florida statute, BJ.F.
sued on a theory of negligence per se. 128 The trial judge agreed that the
newspaper's violation of the statute gave rise to a negligence per se claim,
and a jury awarded BJ.F. $75,000 in compensatory and $25,000 in punitive
damages. 129 That was affirmed per curiam by an intermediate court; the
Florida Supreme Court declined to review. 130 The newspaper petitioned
successfully for certiorari. l3l
Perhaps the change in court personnel over the decade-Justices
Burger, Stewart, and Powell were gone; Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and
Kennedy had arrived-made this a much tougher decision. Or perhaps it .
was the change in leadership from Chief Justice Burger to Chief Justice
Rehnquist. On its facts, this case did not look all that different from the
previous cases. But Justice White, who dissented along with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, declared that the six-to-three Florida Star
decision was the "bottom of the slippery slope" created by the previous
decisions 132-in each of which he had concurred.
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall said Cox did not control the
case because a police report is not a court document and does not carry with
it the constitutionally significant notion of open trials. 133 Daily Mail
provided the proper rule, Justice Marshall said, but he tweaked Chief

123
124

12S
126
121

128
129
130

131
132
133

ld at 104.
ld. at 103.

See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 571 (White, 1., concurring).
491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989).
ld at 528.
ld at 528-29.
ld at 529.
ld
ld
ld at 553 (White, 1., dissenting).
ld at 532.
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Jastice Burger's formulation to add a "narrowly tailored" requirement:
"[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... ,,134 And that
was not the case here. 135 In an opinion that reasonably tracked the substance
ofthe press amici briefs, which were substantial, \36 Justice Marshall pointed
out that a rape victim's privacy might be a state interest of the highest order
under some circumstances, but not where the government itself provided
the information, albeit inadvertently; where the statute covered only the
mass media, and not other forms of dissemination, including neighborhood
gossip; and where no fault was required for liability, making the publication
of truthful information even less protected than publication of a libelous
falsehood. 137
B. Cohen v. Cowles Media\3S

Dan Cohen was a Minneapolis public relations executive associated
with the 1982 gubernatorial campaign of Independent-Republican
Wheelock Whitney. 139 In late October 1982, just six days before the general
election, Cohen contacted a number of journalists in the St. PaulMinneapolis area, offering to give them information concerning a
Democratic-Farmer-Laborite (DFL) candidate in exchange for a promise of
confidentiality.140 Among the journalists accepting the offer were reporters
for the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune. 141
Cohen provided the reporters with public court records showing that
Marlene Johnson, the DFL candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had

134
135

[d at 541.
[d.

136 Brief of Amici Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n & the N.Y. Times Co. et aI., Fla.
Star, 491 U.S. 524 (No. 87-329), 1988 WL 1026321; Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press & Associated Press et al. in Support of the Appellant, Fla. Star, 491 U.S. 524
(No. 87-329), 1988 WL 1026323.
137 Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 538-41.
138 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
139 [d. at 665. See also Bill Salisbury, Burning the Source, WASH. JOURNALISM REv., Sept. 1991, at
18. Much of this history and analysis is adapted from Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right:
Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1135 (1997) [hereinafter Two Wrongs].
140 Salisbury, supra note 139, at 19-20. According to Salisbury, the Pioneer Press reporter involved,
Cohen refused even to describe the information until he received a promise of confidentiality.ld. at 20.
141 [d. Associated Press reporter Gary Nelson and WCCO-TV reporter Dave Nimmer also received
the information. Nelson's stories did not name Cohen, while Nimmer decided the story was not
newsworthy. [d.
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previously been arrested for unlawful assembly and petit theft.142 The
unlawful assembly charges, which grew out of a civil rights demonstration,
were ultimately dismissed. 143 The candidate had been convicted on the theft
charge, which involved a minor shoplifting offense while she had been
emotionally distraught, but the conviction was later vacated. 144
Editors at both the Pioneer Press and the Star Tribune independently
decided to print the story and, over their reporters' protests, to include the
name of the source. 145 While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's
name deep in the story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently
reasoning that the value of the story, if any, lay in Cohen's conduct, not
Johnson's.146 The Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages,
but neither paper reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality
with Cohen.147
Cohen lost his job when the story broke/ 48 and later sued the
newspapers' publishers alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of
contract. 149 Overcoming the publishers' First Amendment claims, Cohen
won $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages
at trial. 150 The Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down the punitive
damage award after finding that Cohen had failed to establish a fraud
claim. 151 The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the compensatory
damage award, holding a contract action "inappropriate" under the
circumstances. 152
During oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, one of the
justices had asked a question about estoppel, a cause of action in equity that
might serve as an alternative to Cohen's contract claim in enforcing the
reporters' promises. 153 Addressing that issue in its opinion, the court found
it necessary to "balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the

142
143

144

145

Cohen, 50\ u.s. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 665-66.
Id. at 666.

146

Salisbury, supra note 139, at 2\-22.

147

Id.

148 Cohen said he was fired, and that position was adopted by the Supreme Court. Cohen, 50\ U.S.
at 666. According to Salisbury, his supervisor said he resigned. Salisbury, supra note \39, at 22.
149 Cohen, 50\ U.S. at 666.

ISO

Id.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.w.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. \989).
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d \99,203 (Minn. \990).
153 Cohen, 50\ U.S. at 666-67. In a successful promissory estoppel action, one who makes, then
breaks, a promise is prevented from denying the existence of contract, despite the absence of a contract
formality. See REST ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
151

152
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common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity." 154 In this case,
the court said, enforcing the promise would violate the newspapers' First
Amendment rightS.155 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
consider the First Amendment implications of this case.,,156
Writing for a five-to-four majority,157 Justice White rejected the
newspapers' argument that this case was controlled by the line of cases
holding that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order.,,158 Instead, Justice White said, the case was
controlled "by the equally well-established line of decisions holding that
generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.,,159
Justice White proceeded to list a number of cases-starting with
Branzburg v. Hayes I6°-purporting to demonstrate that enforcement of
general laws against the press is not subject to any stricter scrutiny than
would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations. 161
Finding Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel just such a "law of
general applicability," Justice White had no problem applying it to the
162
press. He even suggested that the newspapers' breaking their promises
might serve as a predicate for finding their conduct unlawful, thus arguably
negating First Amendment protection for the information itself. 163
Justice White further distinguished Cohen's situation from that of a
plaintiff seeking to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel
claim by stating an alternative cause of action. Specifically citing Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, in which the Court denied a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress without a showing of actual malice,l64
Justice White pointed out that Cohen had not sought damages for injury to

Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205.
ld.
156 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667.
157 Dissenting opinions were written by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter,
id. at 672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackrnun, and
O'Connor, id. at 676 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158 ld. at 668~9 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979».
159 ld. at 669.
160 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
161 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70.
162 ld. at 670.
163 ld. at 671.
164 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
154
155
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his reputation or state of mind, but rather for the loss of his job and his
lowered earning capacity.165
Finally, Justice White tackled the argument that allowing the
promissory estoppel claim would inhibit the press from disclosing the
identity of a confidential source when, as in Cohen, that information is
newsworthy.166 If true, he said, the "chilling effect" would be "no more than
the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying
to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain
kinds of promises to keep them.,,167
Writing for Justices Marshall and Souter in dissent, Justice Blackmun
argued that Hustler should have controlled the outcome in this case and that
First Amendment protection applies to published speech regardless of the
cause of action asserted. 168 Justice Blackmun saw no meaningful distinction
between the kinds of damages sought by Jerry Falwell and those sought by
Daniel Cohen. 169 Justice Souter also filed a separate dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, that rejected Justice
White's reliance on the doctrine of "generally applicable laws," denying
any "talismanic" quality in such laws.I7O Justice Souter would have found
the state's interest in protecting the promise of confidentiality insufficient to
outweigh the value of the information revealed in this case. 171 Nevertheless,
the case was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which reversed its
previous position and held the newspapers liable for Cohen's damages on a
theory of promissory estoppel. 172
In his account of this case, Cohen's lawyer, Elliot Rothenberg, called
the decision "the worst defeat the media had ever suffered in the Supreme
COurt.,,173 Even allowing for some self-indulgent boasting, Rothenberg was
not far off the mark.174 How had the press blown such a big one? Clearly,
there was no lack of legal talent applied to the case. Both newspapers
brought in new legal teams for the Supreme Court contest-"heavy

165
166

167
168

169
170
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Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
/d.
[d. at 671-72.
[d. at 674 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting).
[d. at 675-76.
[d at 677 (Souter, 1., dissenting).
[d. at 679.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. 1992).

173 ELLIOT

C.

ROTHENBERG, THE TAMING OF THE PRESS: COHEN V. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY

218

(1999).
174 In the interest of fulJ disclosure, Rothenberg cites my own ("[a] pro-media law professor")
appraisal of this case as "cut[ ting] short the natural evolution of First Amendment protection for
newsgathering and set[ting] the stage for many wrongheaded opinions coming out of the lower courts
today." /d. at 254 (quoting Easton, Two Wrongs, supra note 139, at 1153).
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artillery," Rothenberg called them. 175 Supreme Court specialist Stephen M.
Shapiro became lead counsel for the Pioneer Press, and eight lawyers
signed its brief. I76 Minneapolis lawyer John French-Harvard Law School
and clerk for Justice Felix Frankfurter-took over the Star Tribune
campaign, and four lawyers signed its brief. 177 Rothenberg's description of
the press amici is particularly apt:
Shapiro's and French were not the only blue-ribbon lawyers joining the
case on the other side. In fact, a battalion of the nation's leading lawyers
and most prominent media organizations entered the Supreme Court
appeal supporting the Star Tribune and Pioneer Press. Nineteen attorneys
from leading law firms in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles filed a
third brief opposing mine. Their amicus curiae brief represented the big
Ieagues 0 fA men' can me d'Ia .... 178

Nor were the press's arguments off track. Indeed, they paralleled, if not
influenced, the arguments of the four dissenting Justices. 179 Apart from
Rothenberg himself, there was no outstanding opposition to the press's
position; heavy hitters like the United States and the ACLU did not have a
dog in the hunt, and even those in or involved with the media who
thoroughly disapproved of the newspapers' conduct stayed out of the
Supreme Court action.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to identify reasons why the press lost
this case. Arguably, the case should have ended with the first state supreme
court opinion; the state court rejected Cohen's contract claim and Cohen
had not raised promissory estoppel. I80 The First Amendment question,
essential to getting the case to the U.s. Supreme Court, need never have
been reached. 18I Timing, too, was a problem for the press. Justice Brennan
retired just before the case was heard, and although his successor, Justice
Souter, also supported the press's position, Justice Brennan's voice would
have been a far more powerful counterweight to Justice White's hostility. 182

Id at 180.
Id
177 Id
178 Id; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. & American Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n et al. in Support of Respondents, Cohen v. Cowles Media, SOl U.S. 663 (No. 90·634)
(1991),1991 WL 11007832.
179 See Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. & American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n et aI. in
Support of Respondents, supra note 178, at .3-6.
180 ROTHENBERG, supra note 173, at 154-55.
181 Id at 156.
182 Id at 158.
175
176
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But perhaps the most serious problem of all was the nature of the case itself
and the dissention it engendered within the media establishment.
It was, after all, in the nature of Cohen that the press was forced to
argue that promises of confidentiality to sources were not serious enough to
be considered contracts without weakening the central argument in
Branzburg that such promises deserved constitutional protection. 183 If not
altogether untenable, the press's position was at best precarious. It was also
highly contentious. Rothenberg quotes University of Minnesota journalism
professor Ted Glasser as characterizing the trial as more "between reporters
and editors" than between plaintiffs and defendants,184 and urging reporters
to oppose the newspapers in any appeal. Glasser wrote:
To claim to have a First Amendment right to renege on a reporter's
promise not only places the press above the law but denies reporters the
very freedom they need to operate in the day-to-day world of journalism.
Reporters have every reason to file a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of
Cohen. 18S
There was no reporters' brief at any level, and the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press was not a signatory to the press's amicus brief.
The Washington Post also declined to join, as did a number of other media
companies who might otherwise have been expected to participate. 186
Rothenberg'S petition for certiorari had capitalized on that dissention by
quoting star media lawyer Floyd Abrams calling the newspapers' conduct
in breaking their reporters' promises of confidentiality "reprehensible and
damaging to all journalists.,,187 Shortly before the decision came down,
Abrams again spoke out publicly in a speech and op-ed column, charging
that:
[The newspapers] acted in a fashion contrary to core principles of
journalistic ethics. They also invited the lawsuit now awaiting decision by
the Supreme Court, one that offers enemies of the press a particularly
inviting target. What the Minnesota newspapers did was wrong; they
should have said so. Why is any defender of the press unwilling to say as
much?188

Id at 181.
Id. at 180.
18S Id. at 134-35 (quoting Theodore L. Glasser, Reporters Seen as Winners in Cohen Verdict, MINN.
J., Oct. 4, 1988, at I).
186 Id at 214.
187 Id. at 166.
188 Id. at 214 (quoting Floyd Abrams, Battles Not Worth Fighting, WASH. POST, June 13, 1991, at
183
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There is no direct evidence that the division within the press over the
Cohen case had a significant or even marginal influence on the outcome.
Nor was there any direct evidence that differences among media
organizations played a significant role in the Court's rejection of
constitutional protection for confidential sources in Branzburg v. Hayes,
although those differences certainly weakened the campaign for federal
shield legislation. There is no doubt, however, that the two most important
news gathering cases ever to reach the u.s. Supreme Court did not show the
press in the best light as a constitutional litigator.
C. The District Court Opinion

For the district court, the conflict between Landmark and Cohen was
easily resolved. According to the court, Landmark only applies where "a
state actor attempted to place a prior restraint on specified speech or where
the intentional interception was legal but the disclosure was illegal.,,189
Here, the court said without further explanation, "there exist no statutory
provisions specifically designed to chill free speech.,,190 Thus finding
Landmark inapplicable, the court went on to find Cohen controlling. "In
reviewing both the federal and the state electronic surveillance laws, we
conclude that both acts are matters of general applicability.,,191
In his motion for reconsideration, Brobst argued that the court's
reliance on Cohen was misplaced and that Landmark did not involve a prior
restraint. ln The Virginia statute at issue in Landmark was "generally
applicable" and did not "single out the press," yet the Supreme Court
reversed the newspaper owner's conviction on First Amendment grounds. 193
This case, Brobst argued, is indistinguishable. 194 Moreover, he said, by
breaking its promise to Cohen, the press arguably obtained its information
unlawfully; here, there was no question that the press obtained its
information lawfully from Yocum, whatever might have happened
earlier. 195 Perhaps recognizing that engaging in a serious analysis of the
issue before it on a motion for summary judgment was probably a waste of
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189 Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996
14, 1996).
190
191

u.s.

Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June
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192 Media Defendants' Brief in Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration, Bartnicki, No. 3:CV94-1201, at 5-{j (M.D. Pa. July 1996)(on file with author).
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time and effort, the district court denied Brobst's motion and kicked the can
down the road. 196 Brobst asked Judge Kosik to certify the case up to the
Third Circuit and he agreed. 197
While Brobst might have taken the case to trial instead of appealing
Judge Kosik's denial of his motion, he acknowledged that there would have
been no point in going that route. Apart from the constitutional claim,
Brobst said:
[W]e didn't have much [in the way of another] defense in this case. They
had us dead to rights on what we did. We clearly had broadcast the tape
many times. There was no doubt about that. It was pretty hard for us to
claim that we didn't know that it had been a surreptitiously recorded
tape. 198

In fact, Brobst said:
[W]e had a settlement agreement with the other side ... that the outcome
of the appeal would decide the outcome of the case because there was no
sense going to trial .... If we win [on the constitutional issue], we don't
have to pay them anything, obviously, and if they win, it was a fixed
amount of money that we would pay them. 199

While the agreement reserved the right of either party to petition the
Supreme Court for review, Brobst said neither side really expected the case
to go that far. 2°O
N. CIRCUIT COURT: APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
On appeal, the parties agreed that no factual issues barred the Third
Circuit from resolving the legal issues/o 1 which boiled down to one: Does
the First Amendment bar the imposition of liability for publishing truthful
information of public significance, where both the acquisition and
publication of that information are prohibited by statute and where the
publisher was not involved in the unlawful acquisition?202
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Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 113 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 u.s. 1260 (2000).
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As might be expected, the appellants continued to rely on the Landmark
doctrine and related cases, asserting that the government's interest in the
privacy of cellular telephone communications is "significantly less[]" than
the interest at stake in Landmark.203 The appellants also cited a remarkably
similar case in which the u.s. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas ruled that the First Amendment protected the press from civil liability
for reporting the contents of an illegally recorded telephone conversation of
a school board trustee, where the tape had been recorded anonymously,
delivered to certain school board members, and played at a public school
board meeting. 204
Perhaps even more interesting was the appellants' attempt to
distinguish Cohen by reciting many of the arguments used against the
media companies in that case: that the newspapers determined the scope of
their own legal obligations by contract, that any restriction on publication
was thus self-imposed, and that the newspapers may not have acted
lawfully in acquiring the information by reneging on a promise of
confidentiality.205 The appellants also argued that the impact of enforcing
the disclosure provisions of the wiretapping statutes would be far greater
than "incidental," as required to impose the Cohen doctrine?06
The appellees framed the case as a contest between the Landmark and
Cohen principles, although of course they asserted that Cohen applied to
this case. 207 The appellees also found a similar case in which a state trial
court had distinguished the Landmark line on two grounds: (1) that the
information in those cases had been properly part of the public record,
albeit protected by statutory confidentiality; and (2) that the information in
the case had been a private conversation, rather than governmental

203 Jd. at 19, 1998 WL 34082380, at *19. One could argue the opposite position, of course: that the
government's interest in protecting government speech is lower than its interest in protecting private
speech, albeit private speech on a public matter. But see Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712,720-21 (pa.
1991) ("Thus the legislature intended for the public interest in a free press to supersede the interests of
an individual whose private conversation regarding his illegal activities had been lawfully intercepted
and lawfully obtained by a newspaper." (footnote omitted».
204 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 22, 1998 WL 34082380, at *22 (citing Peavy v.
New Times, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1997». The following year, however, the Peavy decision
would be reversed in pertinent part by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which
applied an intermediate scrutiny test. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158,193 (5th Cir. 1999).
20S Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 25, 1998 WL 34082380, at *25.
206 Jd. at 25-26, 1998 WL 34082380, at *25-26.
207 Brief of Appellees, supra note 39, at 11, 1998 WL 34083465, at *11.
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records. 208 That case never mentioned the Cohen doctrine at all, but the
appellees devoted a section to amplifying the district court's assertions. 209
The appellees added some new arguments as well. First, they asserted
that the Landmark-related holdings were very narrow and limited to their
specific facts?1O Specifically, the appellees pointed to the famous footnote
eight in Florida Star in which the Court declined to address the question of
"unlawfully" acquired information,211 suggesting the appellants' reliance on
those cases was therefore "misplaced.,,212 The appellants, of course, would
find that footnote irrelevant, since they committed no unlawful act in
acquiring the information.
But even if the strict scrutiny of Landmark controlled, the appellees
argued, the wiretapping statutes would pass muster because they were
narrowly tailored to protect privacy rights of the highest order. 213 Drawing
on legislative history, the appellees asserted that Congress was aware of and
increasingly concerned about the impact of modem communications
technology on personal privacy and the law's failure to keep up with that
technology.214
Appellant Yocum had claimed the status of news-gatherer in his lessthan-coherent brief to the Third Circuit, citing Branzburg v. Hayes for the
proposition that he was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection. 215
The appellees pointed out that, if anything, Branzburg stands for the
proposition that news-gatherers enjoy very limited protection, supporting
their argument based on the Cohen principle, and that in any case, Yocum's
case would succeed or fail on the same grounds as the other appellants'
case?16

208 Id. at 11-13, 1998 WL 34083465, at *11-13 (citing Natoli v. Sullivan, 606 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1993), aff'd, 616 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. App. 1994».
209 Id. at 17, 1998 WL 34083465, at * 17.
210 Id. at 20, 1998 WL 34083465, at *20.
211 Id. at 20-21, 1998 WL 34083465, at *20-21 (citing Florida Star v. RH., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8
(1989) (citations omitted), which states, "The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in
cases where information has been acquired unlawfolly by a newspaper or by a source, government may
ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised
but not definitively resolved in New York Times Co. v. United States and reserved in Landmark
Communications. We have no occasion to address it here.").
212 Id. at 21, 1998 WL 34083465, at *21.
2Il Id. at 13, 1998 WL 34083465, at * 13.
214 Id. at 15, 1998 WL 34083465, at *15.
215 Brief on Behalf of Appellee, Jack Yocum at 15, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.
1998) (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082376, at *15 (citing 8ranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681
(1972».
216 Brief of Appellees, supra note 39, at 28-29,1998 WL 34083465, at *28-29.
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The only amicus brief in the Third Circuit was filed by the PSEA on
behalf of the appellees, and that brief largely echoed the appellees' analysis.
It raised-and criticized-another new decision based on similar facts,217
and it added another argument analogizing the imposition of civil liability
for violation of copyright law and for violation of the wiretap law's
disclosure provisions.218 Two aspects of the PSEA brief, however, bear
mention because of their emphasis in the government's brief and the Third
Circuit opinion. Unlike either the district court opinion or the appellees'
brief, the PSEA brief put particular emphasis on the wiretap statute's
prohibition of "use[s)" of the intercepted materials other than disclosure to
show its more general applicabiliryl19 and characterized the Landmark line
as involving "heightened scrutiny" dependent upon the lawfulness of the
information's initial acquisition. 220 Both of these arguments would be
substantially amplified in the federal government's brief and addressed,
albeit negatively for the most part, in the Third Circuit opinion.
There were no amicus briefs supporting Vopper's position. Brobst does
not know why there was no support from other media organizations at this
stage-"they certainly would have been aware of the case"-but he
acknowledges that he did not solicit any amicus briefs from those
organizations. 221 Given the outcome in the Third Circuit, there was no
apparent need for such support.
Following oral argument before the Third Circuit, the United States
filed a brief-signed by the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice
Department's Civil Division, the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, and two staff appellate attorneys-defending the
constitutionality of the wiretap statute's disclosure provision against the
appellants' as-applied challenge. 222 Under federal law, the United States has
the right to defend the constitutionality of any federal statute challenged on
constitutional grounds.223 Although Brobst argued that his "as-applied"
challenge did not rise to that level/24 the Third Circuit saw the case

217 Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees, supra note 39, at IS n.7, 1998 WL 34083460, at ·15 n.7 (discussing Boehner v. McDennott,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11509 (D.D.C. July 27, 1998), which held that "protecting the privacy of
electronic communications is not of sufficiently 'high[] order' to justify punishing publication of such
communications." (citation omitted».
218 !d. at 7-8,1998 WL 34083460, at ·7-8.
219 !d. at 14, 18-19, 1998 WL 34083460, at ·14, ·18-19.
220 Id. at 16, 1998 WL 34083460, at *16.
221
Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
222 Brief for the United States, supra note 60, at I, 1998 WL 34082480, at .1.
223 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2006).
224 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
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otherwise and immediately after the argument duly issued a letter inviting
the government to file a post-argument brief in the case.225 The
government's brief points out that its filing was both "at the invitation of
the Court" and pursuant to its motion to intervene as of right under the law
to defend the constitutionality of the wiretap statute. 226
The United States can be something of an 800-pound gorilla when it
litigates or intervenes in a constitutional challenge. 227 In an analysis of
twenty-four Supreme Court decisions in which the press litigated against
the federal government, the press won only eight--or 33.3%.228 In this case,
the United States framed the issue less in terms of competing precedents, as
the parties had done, than in terms of levels of First Amendment scrutiny to
be applied.229 The Third Circuit's opinion would track the government's
approach.
Following a focused description ofthe wiretap statute allegedly violated
by Vopper, and a synopsis of the proceeding thus far, the government
summarized its argument: the First Amendment does not prohibit the
application of the wiretap statute's "use prohibitions" to the defendants in
this case. 230 As applied, those provisions are "subject only to intermediate
scrutiny under the First Amendment, rather than strict scrutiny, and the
statute readily satisfies the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.,.231 Thus,
one argument among others suggested in the PSEA brief had become the
foundation for the government's position.
The government argued that the statute's ban on disclosure had to be
read as part of a comprehensive ban on all uses of intercepted material;
thus, the prohibition did not single out speech for any special burden.232
Where that is so, where any burden on speech is merely incidental to the
purpose of the law, First Amendment precedent dictates the application of
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny in determining its
constitutionality.233A statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny if it furthers an
"important" or "substantial" governmental interest (in contrast to strict
scrutiny's "compelling" interest); if that interest is unrelated to the

Brief for the United States, supra note 60, at 10, 1998 WL 34082480, at *10.
Id. at I, 1998 WL 34082480, at * J.
227 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come out Ahead in
Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION, DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342 (Herbert M.
Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003).
228 Easton, Interest Group, supra note 7, at 257-58.
229 Briefforthe United States, supra note 60, at 11-12, 1998 WL 34082480, at *11-12.
230 Id at 11, 1998 WL 34082480, at *11.
231 Id.
232 Id
225

226

2J3

Id at 18-19, 1998 WL 34082480, at *18-19.
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suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on speech is
not unnecessarily great (in contrast to strict scrutiny's "no less restrictive
alternative available,,).234
lntermediate scrutiny is also appropriate, the government said, where
the prohibitions on the use of illegally intercepted communications are not
related to the content of the cornmunications.235 Pointing out that the
appellants would be free to broadcast the very same tape if acquired
lawfully, the government noted that such content-neutral restrictions on
speech also require courts to apply intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny
in evaluating their constitutionality.236 The restrictions at issue in the
Landmark line of cases asserted by the appellants required strict scrutiny
because they singled out speech for special burdens and restricted speech
because of its content, among other reasons. 237
Having established the appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny, the
government then proceeded to show how the wiretap statute satisfied that
standard. The privacy interest to be protected is "manifestly substantial." 238
Moreover, by protecting the confidentiality of communications, the
regulations encourage, rather than suppress, free expression. 239 And, finally,
the regulations are tailored carefully enough that they would even satisfy a
strict scrutiny standard?40
It was a powerful argument, invoking not merely competing analogies,
but basic principles of First Amendment analysis; indeed, the Third Circuit
adopted just such an approach. Writing for herself and Judge Robert
Cowan, Judge Dolores Sloviter rejected the appellants' argument that
Landmark was controlling, noting that the question before the court had
been expressly reserved by the Supreme Court. 241 "[W]e will resolve the
present controversy not by mechanically applying a test gleaned from Cox
and its progeny, but by reviewing First Amendment principles in light of
the unique facts and circumstances of this case.,,242 But Judge Sloviter also
rejected the district court's application of Cohen. Expressing some doubt
that the wiretap statute's disclosure provision was a law of general
applicability, she pointed out that even if it were, Cohen did not stand for

234

235
236
237
238
239
240
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242

!d. at 19, 1998 WL 34082480, at ·19.
Jd at21, 1998 WL 34082480, at *21.
Jd at 22, 1998 WL 34082480, at *22.
Jd at 27-32,1998 WL 34082480, at *27-32.
Jd at 13, 1998 WL 34082480, at *13.
Jd at 35, 1998 WL 34082480, at *35.
!d. at 39, 1998 WL 34082480, at ·39.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109,117 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1260(2000).
Jd.
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the proposition that laws of general applicability are not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. 243 Rather, the Supreme Court held only that
"'enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons
or organizations. ",244
As if to emphasize the importance of the United States as a party in this
case, Judge Sloviter's analysis all but ignores the original parties and
addresses the government's brief directly. Briefly summarizing its argument
for intermediate scrutiny, Judge Sloviter proceeded to mock the
government's assertion that the statute's ban on "disclosure" is merely an
aspect of its ban on "use"-that is, conduct, rather than speech-and thus
merited intermediate scrutiny.245 "A statute that prohibited the 'use' of
evolution theory would surely violate the First Amendment if applied to
prohibit the disclosure of Charles Darwin's writings ....,,246
On the other hand, the court found the content-neutrality argument
more persuasive, based on the Supreme Court's definition of contentneutral restrictions on speech as restrictions that "are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.,,247 Had the Federal
Wiretapping Act's only purpose been to prevent the disclosure of private
facts, Judge Sloviter suggested, its content-neutrality might be doubted. 248
But the government did not rely on that justification; rather, she said,
insofar as the Act's purpose was to deny the illegal interceptor a market for
the "fruits of his labor," it was properly treated as content-neutral and
intermediate scrutiny applied. 249
After reviewing various interpretations of the intermediate scrutiny
standard, Judge Sloviter formulated the question before the court as
"whether the government has shown that its proffered interest"eliminating the demand for intercepted communications-is sufficiently
furthered by imposing liability on the defendants in this case to justify the
restrictions on their First Amendment interests. 25o Finding the connection
"indirect at best," the court concluded that "it would be a long stretch
indeed" to conclude that imposing damages here would even peripherally

243

244
245

246
247
248
249
250

ld at 118.
ld. (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991».
ld at 121.
ld.
ld. at 122 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986».
ld at 123.
ld
ld at 125.
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promote the government's effort to deter interception. 251 Since the Act
already provides punishment for illegal interception, it would be more
effective to enforce those provisions than to impose liability here?52
Writing in dissent, District Judge Louis Pollak agreed with the
majority's analytical approach to the case, but not with its application.
Judge Pollak took issue with the court's assertion that the connection
between prohibiting disclosure and preventing interception was "indirect at
best," citing a recent decision, Boehner v. McDermott, from the u.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to the contrary.253 In that
case, the court opined that, "[u ]nless disclosure is prohibited, there will be
an incentive for illegal interceptions; and ... the damage caused ... will be
compounded.,,254 The majority distinguished Boehner on the ground that the
newspapers reporting the intercepted conversation were not defendants in
that case, and that defendant McDermott, who provided the tape to the
newspapers, knew who had intercepted the conversation and had a political
interest in its disclosure. 255
Following the judgment, Bartnicki and Kane moved for a rehearing by
the entire Third Circuit court. According to Brobst, the motion failed by
only one vote, suggesting the case was much closer than the panel decision
would indicate. 256

v. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESS TAKES NOTICE
A. The Certiorari Process
On April 19, 2000, Bartnicki and Kane filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, asking the u.S. Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit
decision.257 Their original lawyer, Wilkes-Barre attorney Raymond P.
Wendolowski, was still listed on the brief supporting their petition/58 but
with the stakes now that much higher and the venue shifting to Washington,
Wendolowski was no longer listed as counsel of record. That responsibility
was assumed by Robert H. Chanin and Jeremiah A. Collins of the

Id at 125-26.
!d. at 126.
253 Id at 130 (pollak, 1., dissenting).
254 Id at 133 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463,470 (D.c. Cir. 1999».
25S Id at 128-29.
256 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
257 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687), 2000
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059.
258 Id
251

252
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Washington, D.C., firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser,259 a thirty-plus-lawyer firm
that specialized in representing unions. 26o Collins had been part of the team
that wrote the Pennsylvania State Education Association's amicus brief for
the Third Circuit.261 The Bredhoff firm was far more experienced in
Supreme Court litigation and styles itself"the voice oflabor.,,262
Taking a cue from the dissent below, Bartnicki argued that the Supreme
Court should review the case because the Third Circuit decision conflicted
with Boehner, setting up a conflict between two circuits that the Supreme
Court ought to resolve. 263 That kind of argument is considered one of the
most effective at this stage of the process; if four Justices agree that a
conflict exists, the Court will invariably take the case. 264 Bartnicki also
argued that the decision below not only struck down an important provision
of a federal statute, but also called into question similar statutes enacted by
a majority of the states?65 The Third Circuit majority had disparaged that
argument as hyperbole when raised by the dissent, pointing out that its "as
applied" decision was expressly limited to the facts of this case. 266
Finally, Bartnicki asserted that the Third Circuit opinion was just wrong
as to an important question of constitutional law that had been reserved by
the Supreme Court in prior decisions. 267 The petition asserted that the case
provided "an ideal vehicle" for determining whether "a statute that protects
privacy interests by making it unlawful for a person to disclose information
unlawfully obtained by another violates the First Amendment .... ,,268 The
following week, the United States weighed in, seeking certiorari on its own
behalf as an intervenor in the case, with Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman
listed as counsel ofrecord. 269 The government's argument closely paralleled
Bartnicki's.

259

Id

See Welcome to Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.c., BREDHOFF & KAISER P.L.L.C.,
http://www.bredhoff.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
261 See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
262 See Welcome to Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., supra note 260.
263 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 12, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059, at
·20-21.
264 H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 127-28 (1991).
265 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 14-15,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS \059, at
·24-25.
266 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d \09, 128 (3d Cir. 1999).
267 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 15-16,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059, at
·25-26.
268 Id
269 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1728), 2000
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS \063.
260
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When Vopper' s brief in opposition to certiorari was filed on May 30,
the radio host was also represented by new counsel. According to Donald
Brobst, Vopper's employer-Keymarket of NEPA, the owner of radio
stationWILK-had been acquired by Sinclair Broadcast Group sometime
during the pendency of the case.270 While Sinclair initially kept Brobst on as
outside counsel, he had what he describes as a "falling out with in-house
counsel for Sinclair that had nothing to do with this case,,,271 although part
of the problem involved Fred Vopper.
In one case, Brobst said, Sinclair wanted him to defend Vopper in a
case brought by a district attorney who also happened to be running for
judicial office. 272 One of the Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald (RJG) partners
was campaign treasurer, raising a potential conflict of interest for any
lawyer in the firm. 273 Another case involved Vopper challenging the
integrity of two judges before whom RJG had other cases pending. 274
Sinclair's in-house counsel was "not happy about that," Brobst said, and the
relationship started to go downhill.275 After another, unrelated dispute arose,
they "decided to have a parting of the ways on all cases,,,276 and Brobst lost
the chance to take Bartnicki v. Vopper to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Instead, that honor went to Lee Levine, even then a major star in the
media law firmament, having founded his own Washington law firmLevine, Sullivan & Koch, L.L.P.---only three years earlier. 277 This would be
Levine's second argument before the Supreme Court; he had previously
represented the newspaper defendant in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.

270

271
272

273
274

275
276
277

Intetview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
ld.
ld
ld
ld
ld
ld.
Levine's biography shows just how plugged·in to the media defense bar he is:

Mr. Levine has served as Chair of the American Bar Association's Forum on
Communications Law, as President of the Defense Counsel Section of the Media Law
Resource Center, as Chair of both the Media Law Committee and the Publications
Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, ... and as an ABA Advisor to the Uniform
Defamation Act Drafting Committee of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. He currently serves as co-chair of the Practicing Law Institute's annual
Communications Law conference, as a member of the Board of Directors of Fred Friendly
Seminars, Inc.[,] . . . and as a member of the Advisory Board of the Bureau of National
Affairs' Media Law Reporter.

Lee Levine: Biography, LEVINE, SULLIVAN, KOCH & SCHULTZ, L.L.P., http://www.pli.edulContent.
aspx?dsNav=Rpp: I,N:4294934230-16S&ID=PE327995 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
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v. Connaughton.278 Levine also taught media law at Georgetown University
Law Center and co-authored a major treatise on newsgathering. 279 Brobst
recalls that he had some initial contact with the new litigation team-"I sent
them everything they wanted,,280-then bowed out of the case.
Levine's brief in opposition to certiorari rejected all of the reasons for
judicial review raised in the Bartnicki and United States petitions. The
Third Circuit decision "constitutes an unremarkable assessment of whether
the imposition of civil liability" on the media defendants under the Wiretap
Act "survives intermediate scrutiny .... ,,281 "In making this fact-bound
assessment," the brief asserted, "the Third Circuit expressly declined to
address the 'important question of constitutional law' referenced by
Petitioners, 'struck down' no provision of either statute, and applied the
same standard of First Amendment scrutiny embraced by the majority of
the District of Columbia Circuit in Boehner.,,282
Those arguments were echoed in respondent Yocum's brief in
opposition/ 83 but successfully rebutted in reply briefs from Bartnicki284 and
the United States. 285 On June 26, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari?86
In contrast to the Third Circuit proceeding, amicus briefs began flowing
into the Court in September; three of them were filed by litigants in cases
representing nearly identical issues. Representative John Boehner (R-Ohio),
whose victory in the D.C. Circuit had prompted Bartnicki's "split in the
circuits" argument, argued for petitioners that "there is no First Amendment
right to distribute someone else's pilfered speech.,,287 Boehner's opponent,
Representative James McDermott (D-Washington), whose petition for
certiorari was still pending at the time, argued that disclosure provisions of
the wiretap statute should be subject to strict scrutiny.288 WFAA-TV of

m 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989).
279 C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE & ROBERT C. LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW (3d ed.
2005).
280 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43.
281 Briefin Opposition at 4, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060 at *7.
282 [d. at 4, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060, at *7-8.
283 [d. at 5-6, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060, at *9-10.
284 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99-1687), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1062.
28S Reply Brieffor the United States, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99-1687), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1064.
286 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000).
287 Brief of Amicus Curiae Representative John A. Boehner in Support of Petitioners at 3, Bartnicki,
532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 492, at *4.
288 Brief Amicus Curiae of Representative James A. McDermott in Support of Respondents at 2-4,
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Dallas, Texas, which was poised to file its own petition seeking review of
an adverse Fifth Circuit decision,z89 sought to push the Court to the ultimate
rule-further than any other participant:
This case should be decided according to a simple, bright line rule: if a
journalist breaks the law to obtain information, she is subject to whatever
generally applicable legal penalties may be triggered by the act of
misappropriation. However the journalist has obtained information, she
may be punished only for any impropriety in obtaining it, and not for
publishing it, absent a countervailing governmental interest of the highest
order. 29o

Only one other amicus brief was filed on behalf of Bartnicki and Kane;
the cellular telephone industry argued that ensuring the privacy of wireless
communications would further federal policies favoring the free speech of
cell phone subscribers and encouraging the industry's growth. 29I In addition
to McDermott's and WFAA-TV's briefs, four briefs were filed on behalf of
the media defendants. Both the American Civil Liberties Union and The
Liberty Project argued that strict scrutiny, rather than intermediate scrutiny,
was the appropriate standard to apply.292 And Wall Street Journal owner
Dow Jones & Co., with a brief signed by Supreme Court veteran Theodore
Olson, called for "straightforward application of the Daily Mail test,,293_
essentially Brobst's argument in the district and circuit COurtS?94
But the media's principal amicus brief, with Floyd Abrams as counsel
of record, was filed on behalf of more than twenty media entities and
organizations, including newspaper and magazine publishers, television and
cable networks, and journalism trade and professional associations?95 The
list of attorneys representing the amici reads like a "Who's Who" of media

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99·1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 548, at *6-9.
289 Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000).
290 Brief of Amici Curiae WF AA-TV and Robert Riggs in Support of Respondents at 4, Bartnicki,
532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 578, at *6.
291 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association in Support of
Petitioners at 4-9, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
493, at *8-16.
292 Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU and the ACLU of Pennsylvania in Support of Respondents at
5, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 577, at ·10; Brief
of Amicus Curiae of The Liberty Project in Support of Respondents at 5, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos.
99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547, at ·8-9.
293 Brief Amicus Curiae of Dow Jones & Co., Inc. in Support of Respondents at 5, Bartnicki, 532
U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 546, at *11.
294 Id.
295 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, Bartnicki,
532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579.
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law. It is impossible to say with any certainty how much influence any brief
may have had on the Court, but the similarity between the media. entities'
brief and the Court's majority opinion is striking.

B. The Amicus Brief Process
Before discussing the content of the various briefs filed with the Court,
a brief digression is warranted to explore the process through which the
media bar participates as amici curiae in Supreme Court litigation today.
According to Lucy Dalglish, the Executive Director of the Reporters
Committee on Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the process is an informal
one?96 For example, the RCFP first got involved in the Bartnicki case in
June 2000. 297 Legal defense director, Gregg Leslie, had put out an email
message to a number of prominent media lawyers, among them Laura
Handman of Davis Wright Tremaine, Bruce Sanford of Baker Hostetler,
and Lee Levine, asking:
Does anyone know of an amicus effort underway in Bartnicki? We've
always been available to write one, or at least coordinate efforts, but I
assume there will be big companies willing to pay a firm for a brief now
that it's before the high court. If you have any information that you're
available to share, I'd be happy to hear it.298

Soon after, Adam Liptak, then in-house counsel for the New York
Times, now its Supreme Court reporter, replied, "Gregg, yes, there is an
amicus effort. The Times and others have asked Floyd Abrams to prepare a
brief and I'm sure the Reporters Committee will be welcome [to join the
brief] on the usual terms.,,299 By "usual terms," Liptak was referring to the
informal arrangement through which signatories to the brief help the lead
organization (here, the Times) pay for it. The RCFP and other nonprofits
usually ride along for free, and when the RCFP lawyers write the brief, all
others in the media world are invited to join at no charge. 30o Typically,
however, the private entities pay for the privilege. 3ot According to Dalglish,
the cost can vary. 302

2% Interview with Lucy Dalglish, Exec. Dir. of Reporters Comm., Freedom of the Press (June IS,
2010) (recording on file with author).
297 !d.
298 [d.
299 [d.
300 !d.
301 [d.
302 [d.
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"It depends on how much time it's going to take, how many people [the
lawyers] think need to do it. They've been cutting their rates a little bit
lately. In the summertime, they want to do it more because they can use
their summer associates if they have them. I'd say anywhere from $10,000
to $30,000 these days is what it would COSt.,,303 Once the cost is established,
the lead organization would begin "trolling" for signers. 304 If, for example,
the sign-on price is $1,500, Dalglish said, "[I]fyou get a whole pile of folks
signing on, you're doing OK, but if you only get five, you've rolled the dice
and you've lost.,,305
As to the content of the briefs, Dalglish said amici first figure out what
the party they are supporting has already argued, then identify other issues
that the party did not have room for. 306 "Usually, what we try to do is
present a national perspective, do some public policy stuff, or brief an issue
that the parties would have loved to have briefed if they had time or space.
Sometimes they will ask you specifically, could you do this issue.,,307 Other
times, amici will suggest the focus of the brief. In either event, amici will
try to avoid simply repeating the party's arguments. "No court wants to put
3og
up with that," Dalglish said. "I just have no interest in parroting back the
party's brief.,,309
The relationship between amici and the parties varies somewhat
depending upon the court hearing the case. Under Supreme Court ruies/ IO
and throughout the federal system,3l1 all parties must consent to the filing of
an amicus brief; where consent is withheld, amici may petition the court to
receive the brief anyway. Thus, there is always some communication
between the amici and the party they are supporting. Dalglish described the
typical process: "You let them know you're going to do it, and they'll say
'Hey! Yeah, that would be great-wonderful. We'll sign the letter and give
it to you. ",312 On the other hand, the Supreme Court rules require amici to
disclose whether counsel for a party had a hand in writing the brief or
paying for it. 313
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SUP. CT. R. 37.2.
FED. R. APP. P. 29.
Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296.
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Still, the parties often ignite the amicus process. If the case gets to the
Supreme Court, it has already been percolating through the media defense
bar. By the time they have won or lost in the appellate courts, the parties
will have talked about it in one of several forums where members of the
media defense bar get together. Among these are the Practising Law
Institute's annual Communications Law Conference, founded and managed
for some thirty-five years by James Goodale, now conducted by Lee Levine
as Communications Law in the Digital Age;314 the biennial conference and
other meetings of the Media Law Resource Center, formerly the Libel
Defense Resource Center, also based in New York;315 the annual conference
and various workshops of the American Bar Association's Forum on
Communications Law;316 and the annual Media and the Law Seminar at the
University of Kansas. 317
One of the most important of these forums is the District of Columbia
Bar Association's Media Law Committee, which meets informally once a
month for lunch at the offices of one of the participating law firms.3\8 The
meetings were started by Davis Wright's Laura Handman, who chaired
them for two years.3\9 Lee Levine has also chaired the meetings, as have the
RCFP's Gregg Leslie, Covington & Burling's Kurt Wimmer, and Holland
320 Lawyers from Washington, D.C., and often
& Knight's Chuck Tobin.
New York, come to talk about their strategy in cases that have been argued
or to preview upcoming cases. 321 They are not, Dalglish said, strategy
sessions to plan how the bar might get involved. 322
That happens more informally, Dalglish said.323 Frequently, the New
York Times takes the lead, or the Washington Post, or the Associated Press.
"They tend to sort of rotate .... Sometimes it's the individual lawyer [who

314 Floyd Abrams, James Goodale Passes the Torch at PLJ Communications Law Conference,
MLRC MEDIA L. LEITER (Media Law Res. Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2007, at 6, available at
http://www.jamesgoodale.netlimagesIMLRC_PLI_Letter.pdf; see also Seminar, Communications Law
in the Digital Age 2010, PRAcrtSING L.INST. (Nov. 26,2010), http://www.pli.eduiContent.aspx?dsNav=
Rpp:I ,N:4294963947-167&ID=60604.
315 See About MLRC, MEDIA L. REs. CTR., http://www.medialaw.orgITemplate.cfin?Section=
About_MLRC&Template=/ContentManagementIHTMLDisplay.cfin&ContentID=8828 (last visited
Nov. 23,2011).
316 See About Us, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/communications_law/
about_us.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
1I7 See KU CONTINUING Eouc., http://www.continuinged.ku.eduiprograms/media_law/ (last
modified Nov. 4,2011).
31S Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296.
319 1d.
320 1d.
321 1d.
l22 1d.
323 1d.
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is interested in a particular case]. ... Sometimes it's geographic. Sometimes
they have a similar case percolating and they want to jump on it. . . .
Sometimes it's driven by who's interested in covering a story.,,324 Dalglish
says the informal system works so well because the bar is so small. "It's a
very small group of people. Very tight knit. ... So you're seeing these
people frequently, and you're staying on top of things frequently. . . .
Everybody knows everybody else.,,325
As for the Reporters Committee itself, Dalglish noted that she has
former fellows working all over the country. "I will hire a fellow [who] will
spend a year working here. I will work [at] getting him a job at one of the
firms .... And then some of those folks end up going in-house because they
don't like the law firm atmosphere. Right now, I've got former fellows inhouse at the Washington Post and National Public Radio .... [In] the last
couple of years, my folks have been snatched up by the government ... as
FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] officers.,,326
Dalglish said RCFP used to be a lot more involved in direct litigation,
pointing out that "the last time we were actually actively involved as a party
was ... when we went in with the Center for National Security Studies ...
to get a list of the 1,500 or so foreign nationals who were snatched off the
streets and put in detention centers" after Sept. 11, 2001. 327 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ultimately reversed an initially
favorable decision by the district COurt.328 During the past decade or so,
since Dalglish has been executive director, the RCFP has been doing more
amicus briefs. 329
"We look for cases that will have the potential to have an impact on
what journalists are able to do, either in their home state or on the federal
level, and that can be in regards to an open meetings or open records
violation.,,33o "It can be getting involved in a libel case, or certainly in a
reporter's privilege case. We tend not to get involved at the trial level,"
Dalglish said, citing lack of need, cost, and the potential to irritate trial
judges.331 "That's not to say we haven't done it, but at the trial court level
we usually try to get involved if it is an issue that can be of great relevance
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to the media, but neither of the parties is a media entity.'.J32 Expanding on
the RFCP's role, she added, "We may look at some of the pleadings and
decide that there may be a benefit to having a media lawyer write the brief
and raise some issues that perhaps [another lawyer would see
differently]. ,,333
Dalglish said she also tries "not to get involved at the cert. petition
stage at the U.S. Supreme Court, unless there's a compelling reason to,"
like if it's "a case we really, really want them to take, or a case that we
know they're going to take and we want to get the issue teed up right away.
And, quite honestly, there's one other very important factor, and that has to
do withjoumalism politics. We want to stake our territory. We want to do a
brief and show that the Reporters Committee is on top of it.,,334
"If [the case is] at an intermediate court level at the federal level, we're
almost certainly going to get involved if it involves anything having to do
with the media. Sometimes, they slip by US.,,335 In Bartnicki, where no
media amicus briefs were filed in the Third Circuit proceeding, Dalglish
recalls that other, similar cases were being "teed up" at about the same
time. 336 "Hopefully, we've gotten a little bit better at spotting them on the
circuit level, but that doesn't mean we always catch them.... Certainly,
when the Supreme Court took [Bartnicki], we got involved in force.,,337
C The Briefs

Most of the arguments in the parties' briefs had been auditioned below.
Bartnicki and Kane began their argument for reversing the Third Circuit
opinion by urging the Court to adopt an intermediate scrutiny standard-a
point on which the Third Circuit agreed. 338 It next walked the Court through
an unremarkable analysis to show that the statutes, as applied, satisfy that
standard. 339 The federal government's brief made essentially the same

332
333
334

335

Id.
Id.
Id.
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336 Specifically, Dalglish was referring to Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(upholding the disclosure provisions of the wiretap act where the defendant congressman allegedly knew
the interceptors and promised them immunity for their illegal conduct) and Peavy v. WFAA-TV. Inc.,
221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding the disclosure provisions where the defendant television station
not only knew the interceptions were illegal, but participated in their acquisition).
337 Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296.
338 Brieffor Petitioners Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr. at 13, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briefs LEXIS 494, at *26.
339 See id. at 12-16,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 494, at *25-32.
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case. 340 For Vopper and the other media defendants, Levine argued that the
case required application of the Daily Mail principle, another way of
arguing for strict scrutiny, but he added that the statutes in question would
not even satisfy intermediate scrutiny.341 Yocum, who had by now retained
his own Supreme Court specialist, Thomas C. Goldstein, made the same
arguments in reverse order. 342 The petitioners' reply briefs broke little new
ground. 343
Floyd Abrams's amicus brief for the "media entities" also argued that
the Third Circuit opinion should be affirmed on a Florida Star (i.e.,
Landmark or Daily Mail) analysis,344 noting only in a footnote that the
statute would fail intermediate scrutiny as well. 345 But Abrams prefaced his
legal argument with a much broader policy appeal:
From the time individuals first consider becoming journalists, two
principles are drilled into them ....
The first is that telling the truth about matters of public interest is what
joumalism, at its best, is all about. ... [J]ournalists who read opinions of
this Court find unsurprising this Court's repeated references to "the
overarching public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the
dissemination of truth." That public interest is directly imperiled in this
case.
So is the journalistic norm that in the course of gathering news, journalists
should affirmatively seek the truth from those who have it ....

For journalists, then, the notion that liability may be imposed upon them
for doing nothing more or less than reporting truthfully about newsworthy

340 Brieffor the United States at 10-15, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 491, at *22-31.
341 Brieffor Respondents Frederick W. Vopper, Keymarket ofNEPA, Inc. and Lackazerne, Inc. at
13-17, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 581, at *2939.
342 Brief for Respondent Jack Yocum at 6-10, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728),
2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 580, at *15-23.
343 See Reply Brief for Petitioners Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr., Bartnicki, 532 U.S.
514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 659; Reply Brief for the United States,
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 658.
344 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, supra note
295, at 6-9,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *15-19.
345 ld. at 27 n.34, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *48 n.34.
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Although the Third Circuit had viewed the government's interest in
deterring unlawful interceptions as the most, albeit insufficiently,
compelling justification for the statute's non-disclosure provisions, Abrams
focused on the privacy interest. 347 The privacy interests held insufficient in
the Florida Star line of cases, he said, were no less powerful than the
privacy interests in this case. 348 Abrams asked, "[W]hy, after all, is the right
of a rape victim not to have her name disclosed less significant than that of
a union official not to have a telephone call disclosed in which he
threatened to engage in criminal conduct?,,349
Abrams moved on to reject the notion, advanced by Bartnicki, that the
Florida Star line of cases was limited to content-based restrictions on
speech and, thus, not appiicable to the content-neutral disclosure restrictions
of the wiretap laws. 35o Rather, he said, that line of authority is firmly
grounded in the public interest in truth-telling.35I Abrams also made the
seemingly unnecessary argument that the media defendants acted lawfully
in obtaining the tape,352 then returned to balance of privacy and truth-telling
interests. 353 In the very last paragraph of the argument, almost as an
afterthought, Abrams struck the precise theme that would dominate the
Supreme Court's opinion:
We offer the final thought that there is, in the end, a certain lack of
equivalence between the First Amendment interests at stake here and the
privacy interests that underlie the wiretapping statute. Both are important
but only one is in the written Constitution. It should not be too late to
assert that when the First Amendment's protection of truth-telling is pitted
against an interest that was only first identified just over a century ago,
some deference should be given to the Framer's expressed intentions. 354
Oral arguments were held on December 5, 2000. 355 Collins led off for
petitioners Bartnicki and Kane, and his responses to the Court's questions
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Id. at 2-5, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *8-14 (citation omitted).
Id. at ~20, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *1~37.
Id at 15,2000 U.S. S. Ct Briel5 LEXIS 579, at *29.
Id.
Id at 20-24, 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briel5 LEXIS 579, at *37-42.
Id
See id at 24-25, 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briefs LEXIS 579, at *42-43.
Id at 25-30, 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briel5 LEXIS 579, at *43-52.
Id at 30, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *51-52 (footnote omitted).

Oral Argument, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 WL
1801619.
355
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emphasized the content-neutrality of the anti-disclosure statutes?56 When a
content-neutral statutory regime that protects important governmental
interests would be harmed by disclosure, he said, "we believe and we have
argued that that in essence exhausts the First Amendment concerns ....,,357
Solicitor General Waxman, who argued next, contradicted Collins's
"suggestion" that no heightened scrutiny is required here. 358 "That's not our
position," he said; "we submit that the appropriate level of scrutiny is
intermediate-level scrutiny ....,,359
Justice Anthony Kennedy and others expressed concern that the statutes
created a class of speech that was forever tainted and could not be repeated
by anyone. 360 Waxman countered that once the speech became publicly
known, the statutes would no longer apply.361 Thus a newspaper was free to
comment on the conversation once Vopper broadcast it. 362 He also defended
the argument that enforcing the anti-disclosure statutes would deter
unlawful interceptions.363
Levine began his oral argument by calling attention to the threat
contained in the intercepted conversation, which led to a distracting
colloquy with Justice John Paul Stevens and others about whether he
wanted to win his case on that narrow ground or on principle. 364 Insisting,
as he was bound to do, that he would take the win "any way I can get it,"
Levine focused on the Daily Mail principle as the proper basis for
decision. 365 Levine denied that the statutes' content neutrality would require
an intermediate scrutiny analysis, but asserted that the anti-disclosure
provisions would not survive even that modest test. 366
The balance of Levine's time was taken up with an inconclusive
discussion of the statutes' deterrence value, and that was where Yocum's
counsel, Thomas Goldstein, began his appearance before the Court. 367
"Even if [the anti-disclosure provisions] add some deterrent, that
prohibition is too crude a weapon, effectively a thermonuclear bomb of
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Id, 2000 WL 1801619,81 *9-15.
Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at .11.
Id., 2000WL 1801619,81 *16-19.
Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at .16-17.
Id,2000WLI801619,at*21.
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See id., 2000 WL 1801619, at *21-23.
Id.,2000WL 1801619,at.22-23.
Id,2000WL 1801619,81 *25-27.
!d., 2000 WL 1801619, at .27.
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sorts to be sustained in the sensitive area of . . . free speech. ,,368 Goldstein
endorsed the Third Circuit's intermediate scrutiny approach,369 and took
issue with Waxman's assertion that the statutes' effectively immunized
down-stream commentary on the intercepted conversation. 370 Waxman, in a
brief rebuttal, defended the deterrence argument and distinguished the Daily
Mail line of cases.371 At 12:03 p.m., Chief Justice Rehnquist declared the
case submitted. 372
VI. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION: AD Hoc BALANCING

In his opinion for the Court, delivered May 21, 2001, Justice Stevens
adopted the frame that Abrams had urged-a conflict between the "full and
free dissemination of information concerning public issues" and "individual
privacy.,,373 Justice Stevens's formulation of the issue, however, labeled
both interests "of the highest order," and he appeared to accept the idea,
advanced by the petitioners, that the disclosure provisions of the statute
would "foster[] private speech.,,374 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens promptly
declared that the disclosures made in this case were protected by the First
Amendment. 375
The opinion that followed was unusually disjointed, shifting from
doctrinal analysis, to interrogation of precedents, and ultimately to ad hoc
balancing. Justice Stevens began by accepting the petitioners'
characterization of the disclosure provisions as a "content-neutral law of
general applicability.,,376 Unlike the trial court, however, he did not find that
dispositive. "On the other hand," he said, "the naked prohibition against
disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech,,,377 as if
that somehow negated or counterbalanced the general applicability doctrine
as applied in Cohen v. Cowles Media. 378
Seeming to reach a dead end with this doctrinal inquiry, Justice Stevens
shifted abruptly to interrogating precedent.379 Here, too, the analysis ended
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without resolution, with Justice Stevens pointing out that neither the
Pentagon Papers case,380 nor the Landmark-Daily Mail-Florida Star line of
cases,381 resolved the question presented here. 382 The only lesson Justice
Stevens seemed to take from these precedents was the need to balance, on
the facts of this case, the interests served by the law against its restrictions
on speech.
Like the Third Circuit, Justice Stevens ultimately rejected the
government's asserted interest in deterring interception of private
conversations as a bona fide interest of the "highest order.,,383 Unlike the
Third Circuit, he found the privacy interest compromised here to be a "valid
independent justification for prohibiting such disclosures . . . .,,384
Nevertheless, those privacy interests had to "give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.,,385 Drawing
principally on libel cases for support, Justice Stevens held that a "stranger's
illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from
speech about a matter of public concem.,,386
In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
Justice Stephen Breyer emphasized the narrowness of the Court's
holding. 387 Justice Breyer, well known for his ad hoc balancing approach to
First Amendment cases,388 cautioned that this case was decided on the facts
that the broadcasters acted lawfully in obtaining the information and the
information involved the threat of physical harm to others. 389 It did not
signal a "significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media," he
wamed. 390
Justice Breyer asserted that concepts like "strict scrutiny" are
inappropriate to resolve competing interests. 391 He also seemed to put far
more value in the deterrent effect of the anti-disclosure provisions than
either the majority or Third Circuit opinion?92 But on these facts, Justice

N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
See supra Part 1I1.A.
382 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
383 Ed. at 531-32.
384 Ed. at 533.
385 Ed. at 534.
3&6 Ed. at 535.
387 Ed. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
388 See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Caught in Breyer's Patch, PRACTISING L. INST., Nov. 1996, at 923;
Bruce J. Ennis, Courtside, COMM. LAW., FalI 1999, at 14, available at http://www.abanet.org/forumsi
communicationlcomlawyer/faI199/courtside.html.
389 Bartniclci, 532 U.S. at 535-36 (Breyer, 1., concuning).
39() Ed. at 536.
391 Id.
392 See id. at 537.
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Breyer said, the speakers had no "legitimate" interest in the privacy of a
threat to harm others-even where the danger had passed. 393 Justice Breyer
also emphasized that Bartnicki and Kane were "limited public figures" with
a "lesser" interest in privacy.394
Justice Breyer concluded that the Court did "not create a 'public
interest' exception that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting general
rule.,,395 Rather, he said, these speakers' privacy expectations were
unusually low, while the public interest in "defeating those expectations"
was unusually high?96 And thus, he "would not extend that holding beyond
these present circumstances.,,397
Of course, the dissenters would not have gone even that far. Writing for
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist correctly identified the contradiction in Justice Stevens's
acknowledgment that the anti-disclosure provisions were "content-neutral
law[s] of general applicability" and the outcome that Justice Stevens
ultimately reached. 398 But he inexplicably mischaracterized Justice
Stevens's analytical approach as a kind of strict scrutiny derived from "the
Daily Mail string of newspaper cases," which he proceeded to read as
narrowly as possible. 399 As noted above, Justice Stevens paid very little
attention to that line of cases, and barely mentioned strict scrutiny doctrine.
Justice Breyer's characterization of a fact-bound balancing came far closer
to the essence of the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also took issue with Justice Stevens's rejection
of the government's deterrence argument, calling "[r]eliance upon the 'dryup-the-market' theory . . . both logical and eminently reasonable ... .',400
And he emphasized the First Amendment right of Bartnicki and Kane to
keep their conversation from the public domain. 40' Finally, he castigated the
Court for relying on the Pentagon Papers case and "other inapposite cases"
to subordinate the right to communications privacy "to the claims of those
who wish to publish the intercepted conversations of others.',402
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[d. at 539.
[d.
[d. at 540.
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[d.
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[d.
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[d.
[d.
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at 541.
at 544 (Rehnquist, 1., dissenting) (citation omitted).
at 545-49.
at 552-53.
at 553.
at 555-56.
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VII. CONCLUSION: A MIXED BLESSING?
In assessing the impact of Bartnicki on the future development of First
Amendment doctrine, one may choose to adopt the expansive reading given
the majority opinion by the dissent or the narrow reading given in the
concurrence. Ironically, the press would surely favor the former; indeed,
they argued all along for strict scrutiny and the invocation of the
constitutional privacy cases. The concurring opinion is far more
problematic: can one broadcast an intercepted conversation that does not
threaten physical harm? Justice Stevens's opinion is so poorly crafted as to
leave in doubt not merely the answer, but even the proper analytical
approach. 403
To take one hypothetical "ripped from the headlines" as this Article was
being drafted, consider the prospective case against WikiLeaks.com for
publishing hundreds of thousands of military and diplomatic documents
allegedly downloaded from a government database by a disaffected
soldier.404 As of this writing, no indictment had been handed up by a grand
jury, but assuming arguendo that no one associated with WikiLeaks
participated in the unlawful leaking except as beneficiary, there is only one
difference between the case against WikiLeaks and the case against Fred
Vopper: national security versus personal privacy as the subject matter of
the unlawfully acquired information. 405
Thus, if one reads Bartnicki as imposing strict scrutiny when reviewing
any restriction on the dissemination of unlawfully obtained, but publicly
important information, where the disseminator did not participate in the
unlawful acquisition, then WikiLeaks is home free. On the other hand, if
one reads Bartnicki as a case of ad hoc balancing, then the Court will
ultimately have to decide whether the freedom to publish without fear of
sanction is outweighed in this case by national security, as opposed to
personal privacy, considerations.
So far, the lower courts' applications of Bartnicki have not been
particularly helpful in that regard. Several cases have distinguished

403 See Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for
Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1118 (2002) ("Astonishingly, at no point in Justice
Stevens's opinion does the Court come right out and say what standard of review or doctrinal test it is
applying to the laws before it.").
404 See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Scholars Warn of
Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at AI8, available at http://www.nytimes.comJ2010/12/02/
worldl02Iegal.html.
405 There are no legally meaningful differences between the website and the radio station as
platforms or between Assange and Vopper as communicators, absent Assange's complicity in the
unlawful leaking of the information.
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Bartnicki on the ground that the disclosures were not a matter of public
concern. 406 Others have distinguished Bartnicki on the ground that the
disseminator participated in the illegal conduct that led to disclosure. 407 Still
others have distinguished Bartnicki where the disclosures involved trade
secrets,408 copyrights,409 or data mining. 4lo In no case reported to date has
the holding in Bartnicki been applied to reach a similar conclusion in an
analogous case. 411
The scholarly literature has been rather more enlightening. In his article
Information as Contraband, published shortly after the Court issued its
opinion in Bartnicki, and clearly inspired by that case, Rodney Smolla saw
Bartnicki as an immediate victory for the press, but a longer term victory
for privacy interests. 412 With a majority of Justices (two concurring and
three dissenting) accepting an effective intermediate scrutiny standard,413
albeit with a "newsworthiness" safety-valve,414 Smolla saw the case as

406 See. e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (lOth Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Bartnicki where
intercepted conversations regarding one family's anti-Semitic remarks about another family in the
neighborhood were not matters of public concern); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-41
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Bartnicki where speech at issue-target marketing lists comprising
names, addresses, and financial information-involved only matters of private concern); Doe v. Luster,
No. BI84508, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6042, at *15-16 (July 25, 2007) (distinguishing Bartnicki
where speech at issue-a videotape of woman being raped-is not a matter of public concern); M.G. v.
Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing Bartnicki where
speech at issue--photo of team coached by child molester-was not a matter of public concern).
407 See. e.g., Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2006), affd en bane, 484 F.3d
573 (2007) (defendant's actual knowledge of the circumstances of the illegal interception made this case
distinguishable from Bartnicki); Bowens v. Ary, No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000, at *20-21
(Sept. 24, 2009) (distinguishing Bartnicki where the defendant directed the recording of a private
conversation without consent); State v. Baron, 769 N.W.2d 34, 48 (2009) (distinguishing Bartnicki
where the defendant illegally accessed the email account of a public official to disseminate truthful
information about him).
408 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d I, IS (Cal. 2003) (Bartnicki inapplicable, by
its own terms, where disclosure in question involved trade secrets).
409 See Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 354 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (distinguishing Bartnicki where the cause of action is copyright infringement and
misappropriation of hot news).
410 See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (Bartnicki inapplicable where
disclosure and use of personally identifiable information by a data mining company was found to be
conduct, not speech).
411 Indeed, in SEC v. Rajaratnam, the court quoted Bartnicki for the proposition that "'disclosure of
the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception
itself'" 622 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
533 (2001».
412 Smolla, supra note 403, at 1149-50.
413 [d. at 1119.
414 /d. at 1170.
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elevating personal privacy to an interest of constitutional dimension on a
par with freedom of speech and press.415
Nevertheless, Smolla drew exactly the opposite conclusion with respect
to classified information. Hypothesizing a new "Official Secrets Act" of the
kind enacted by Congress to punish journalists for disclosing leaked
classified information, and vetoed by President Clinton,416 Smolla drew a
sharp distinction between the "steal" considered in Bartnicki and the "leak"
contemplated by the new law. Quoting both Laurence Tribe417 and Potter
Stewart,418 Smolla asserted that "[r]espect for the structural independence of
the media contemplated by the Constitution prohibits courts from
conscripting journalists as leak-police.',419 Thus, to Smolla, even the
narrowest reading of Bartnicki poses no danger for a Julian Assangeassuming his hands are otherwise clean and WikiLeaks is found to share
that "structural independence. ,,420
Of course, the Court has changed since Smolla wrote in 2002, and so
has the temper of the times. It may be that the best that can be said for the
Bartnicki decision is that, absent participation in the unlawful acquisition of
newsworthy information, the press is as free to publish it as changing
societal values will allow. At the very least, the "content-neutral law of
general applicability" no longer presents the insurmountable obstacle to
First Amendment protection that it was under Cohen v. Cowles Media. 421
The Landmark-Daily Mail-Florida Star line of cases has emerged none the
worse for wear--Chief Justice Rehnquist's crabbed reading garners only
three votes. And, most importantly, Fred Vopper and his media allies got
the outcome they wanted, if not the mandate, taking the press a small step
closer to the ultimate goal of protection for all truthful information of public
importance.

Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1166--67.
417 Id. at 1167 ('There may be some rough 'law of the jungle' notion at work here: even if no
sweeping right to know will be recognized as a limit on government's power to try to keep matters
bottled up, an outsider who manages to obtain otherwise confidential information cannot then be
prevented from disseminating it-or punished for having done so." (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 965 (2d ed. 1988)}}.
418 [d. at 1168 ("So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows,
and may seek to learn what it can." (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,636
(I 975}}}.
419 [d. at 1168.
420 See id
421 501 U.S. 663 (I 991}.
41S
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